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Abstract 
 
The United Kingdom’s General Medical Council investigation of Dr. Michael Munro raises 
concerns about the ability of normative ethics to satisfactorily ‘solve’ ethical dilemmas in 
isolation within the real world. In this particular case it seems vague utilitarian principles were 
used to justify actions by a doctor that many people find morally unacceptable. This raises 
questions of what we might do when we find our normative ethical theories conflicting with our 
moral intuitions. Is there more to our ethical deliberations than merely implementing specific 
normative theories? Is there in fact a role for considering other elements in the decision-making 
process, such as one’s moral intuition? I suggest that despite being criticised as overly subjective 
or unreliable, there may still be a persuasive social and moral justification for paying attention to 
the unease of moral intuition when we find it conflicting with our normative judgments, 
especially in complex real-life clinical situations. 
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Moral Intuition in Clinical Decision-Making 
In July 2007, Dr. Michael Munro was brought before a fitness-to-practice committee 
of the United Kingdom’s General Medical Council (the GMC). The consultant neonatologist 
was under investigation following his management of two babies, Baby Y and Baby X, in 
July and December 2005. Both had been born prematurely, and both had respiratory or 
neurological disability severe enough to be considered incompatible with life (Dyer, 2007). In 
each case, the medical team (along with the parents) made the difficult decision to withdraw 
medical care and allow the babies to die. Soon after the ventilation was removed from both 
children, they began ‘agonal gasping’—an intense and laboured respiratory pattern seen 
immediately prior to terminal apnoea. Dr. Munro, therefore, made a decision to administer 
the muscle relaxant pancuronium to the infants, and both subsequently died. The GMC 
committee was clear about the ramifications of Dr. Munro’s actions:  
The administration by [Dr. Munro] of pancuronium in each case did not treat the cause of 
agonal gasping, prevented the manifestation of the sign of agonal gasping, stopped the baby 
breathing and hastened death (General Medical Council, 2007). 
 
However, the committee went on to state they did not believe Dr. Munro had acted 
inappropriately. The panel based their reasoning on the ‘undisputed’ fact that his intention 
was to relieve the suffering he believed the babies were experiencing, not to hasten their 
deaths.  
The controversial issue of using muscle relaxants to prevent or stop agonal respiration 
was addressed in the Journal of Medical Ethics in 2002 (Perkin & Resnik, 2002). Much of 
the subsequent debate focussed on the defensibility of employing the principle of double 
effect in such cases, and specifically on the problem of distinguishing outcomes which are 
intended from those which are merely foreseen. Critics commented it often proves impossible 
to draw such distinctions, therefore clouding the boundary between palliative care and 
euthanasia when muscle relaxants are used (Hawryluck, 2002; Kuhse, 2002). A key premise 
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underlying Perkin and Resnik’s argument in favour of using muscle relaxants was that a 
patient who is exhibiting signs of agonal respiration may be suffering. Given the uncertainty, 
they argued, the most morally responsible thing to do is to “err on the side of relieving 
possible pain and suffering instead of erring on the side of not relieving pain and 
suffering”(Perkin & Resnik, 2002). Such a suggestion underlines the distinctly utilitarian 
character of their reasoning. This is further emphasised when they later go on to suggest that 
“When death is inevitable and compassionate terminal care is required, not only the patient’s 
comfort but also the minimisation of the loved ones’ distress becomes a priority”.  
The Utilitarian position 
Utilitarianism belongs to the class of moral theories which state that the consequences 
of our actions are the most important factors to evaluate when making a decision. The 
overriding principle of utilitarianism is the so-called “Greatest Happiness Principle” 
established and refined by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Broadly stated, it says that 
one should aim to promote the maximum net welfare (described in terms of happiness) for 
the greatest number of people. Preference is given to the action that promotes the most 
welfare compared to the other options available (Steinbock et al, 2003). Importantly, utility is 
judged from an impartial perspective, the right action being the one that produces the most 
happiness overall and not just for the agent involved (Mackie, 1990). A broadly utilitarian 
justification for the use of muscle relaxants was repeated by Dr. Munro at his hearing, and is 
apparently condoned by the GMC within their ruling of his case (General Medical Council, 
2007). What is noticeable about such reasoning is that, by giving the benefit of the doubt to 
the uncertainty of the infants’ experiences, the utilitarian position gives itself freedom to 
justify actions which could otherwise be argued to be intuitively unacceptable – in this case, 
hastening the deaths of these two babies. It might seem somewhat bizarre that the GMC was 
satisfied Dr. Munro had not acted inappropriately, despite finding he had indeed prescribed 
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twenty-three times the normal dose of pancuronium [a muscle relaxant with no analgesic or 
sedative properties], and that his actions clearly hastened the deaths of the two children. An 
English court of law would necessarily find him guilty of murder, given that the link between 
his actions and the deaths of the infants can clearly be established (Brazier, 2003). (Sure 
enough, in the case against Dr. Nigel Cox in 1992, the prosecution made it clear any doctor 
who deliberately ends the life of a patient—however compassionate the motive—is liable for 
murder (R. v Cox, 1992)). In dismissing the claim against Dr. Munro, the GMC circumvented 
the impossible task of exploring his intention at the moment he administered the 
pancuronium, and instead opted to sanction his conduct with an apparently general utilitarian 
justification that he had acted to maximise the welfare of each child (by minimising their 
suffering), and arguably also of the relatives and carers involved. The counterargument that 
the committee’s decision was based on a different, ‘middle-level’ ethical principle such as 
beneficence is not convincing, given that it is by no means clear that the infants were in fact 
suffering. The appearance of a calculation by Dr. Munro and the GMC regarding the course 
of action that would maximise overall welfare and utility underlines the overtly utilitarian 
approach employed in this case, either consciously or not. As previously suggested, this 
calculation bypasses a crucial issue - his intention - and will therefore remain unsatisfactory 
to those who believe there is something intuitively wrong about Dr. Munro’s actions. 
Has something gone amiss? The application of normative theory in moral dilemmas 
such as this is thought to help us decide (or justify) what we ought to do. But how should we 
view our familiar normative theories when they seem to lead us to conclusions or 
justifications which conflict with our moral intuitions? It can be argued in the case of Dr. 
Munro that the application of broad utilitarian principles has been used to justify an action 
which is contrary to widely-held moral convictions about the acceptable limits of medical 
intervention at the end of life. It is interesting to note Dr. Munro himself specifically warned 
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the babies’ parents that administering the pancuronium was on “the verge of what society 
finds acceptable.” (BBC News, 2007). What does this suggest about the presence of a 
significant discrepancy between our generalised moral theories and our day-to-day, specific 
moral judgments? Can we ever reconcile supposedly ‘objective’ normative reasoning with 
our subjective, intuitive beliefs? 
Moral intuition: origins, uses and problems 
From personal experiences, we are all aware human beings often have immediate and 
instinctive emotional reactions to various situations; behaviours or actions can simply ‘feel’ 
right or wrong. Sometimes the reasoning underlying these feelings is not scrutinised or 
justified, but the intractably personal nature of a moral conviction is taken by many to be a 
sure sign of its validity. Without receiving any formal preparatory ethical teaching in infancy, 
we are generally able to navigate our way through myriad social situations, relationships, 
conflicts and dilemmas with remarkable success as we grow up, and all the time we 
continually refine our day-to-day ethical concepts. Miranda Fricker has argued along similar 
lines, and further suggests moral intuitions are the result of previous ethical interactions and 
events, the “internalisation of lessons learned from past experiences that are brought about by 
an appropriate moral ‘upbringing’”(Fricker, 1995). But even basic attempts such as these to 
rationalise intuitions are fraught with difficulties. For instance, Fricker’s simple explanation 
leads us to question further what an “appropriate” moral upbringing involves, or how our 
current moral convictions would be constructed if the lessons learned from past experiences 
were contradictory or incoherent.  
Much of the debate over the defensibility of intuition, therefore, inevitably leads to 
the conclusion that our moral convictions are inescapable subjective ethical biases, and as 
such their reliability is severely questionable. But despite the possibility our intuitions can be 
irrational, confused, mistaken, or amenable to persuasion or modification, there remains a 
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great reluctance to disregard them entirely. Firstly, Shaw reminds us that “moral intuitions 
are so often right, or at least consistent with a widespread view of what is right.”(Shaw, 
2001). There is of course, something faintly question-begging about this claim, as it 
necessarily presupposes an objective standard of rightness. Secondly, it has been recognised 
by others that our ordinary moral convictions have been used widely throughout history as a 
test of the adequacy of our formal normative ethical theories; those theories which have 
appeared counter-intuitive have often found it difficult to be widely accepted (Frey, 1977). 
But even this fact by itself helps us very little when deciding what to do upon discovering an 
otherwise agreeable and defensible normative theory being employed to defend morally 
dubious, possibly illegal actions (such as those of Dr. Munro).  
Of course, there are many who would simply find fault with the normative theory 
itself, or look towards different interpretations of the same theory for assistance. For example, 
whereas act utilitarians may yield to the conclusion Dr. Munro acted appropriately, rule 
utilitarians might well conclude he acted inappropriately by violating a utility-maximising 
rule against doctors ‘killing’ patients (assuming of course that such a rule would be utility-
maximising). The debate over these issues is clearly long and complex, and will not be 
reiterated in depth here.  For my purposes, it is enough to recognise that one can accept 
utilitarian principles as a suitable approach to ethical problems in broad and general terms, 
yet still be uncomfortable with some of its counter-intuitive conclusions. What should we do 
in such situations? My suggestion is that we can give more weight to our intuitive judgments, 
and thereby confront the largely unchallenged supremacy of the normative theories to tell us 
how we ought to act. Cowley (2005) has suggested there is a danger in always simplifying 
and standardising the competing components of ethical dilemmas to fit within normative 
frameworks: 
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In a welter of conflicting ethical intuitions, it is undoubtedly tempting to reach for a scientific 
way to solve the problem: and it is at this point that the cumbersome machinery of ethical 
theories and principles are wheeled in. 
 
The problem with these ‘cumbersome’ ethical theories and principles is that a reliance on 
applying them to moral dilemmas may lead to what Lawlor (2007) has dubbed a “particularly 
crude form of ethical relativism” in which the answer to an ethical problem simply depends 
on one’s own preference for a particular ethical theory. But I believe to overlook the varying 
intuitive convictions surrounding a moral problem is to forget a crucial aspect of any 
particular ethical deliberation. 
In defence of moral intuition for clinical dilemmas 
 With all the controversy surrounding the application of our ethical theories in 
isolation, we may find ourselves in certain clinical dilemmas returning to consider the 
defensibility of our moral intuitions or judgments. Possibly the most damning charge against 
such intuitive convictions is that they are wholly subjective, relative and unreliable. As 
Rachels (2003) claims, “We cannot rely on our feelings, for no matter how powerful they 
may be our feelings may be irrational: they may be nothing but the products of prejudice, 
selfishness, or cultural conditioning.” But might we yet be able to defend a role for the 
consideration of moral intuitions in real-life dilemmas? I believe a persuasive argument can 
be made that, because of our complex social existence, all our social interactions (and the 
rules and customs we derive from them) are inextricably linked with our understanding of 
morality. Wilson claims “To most people, morality is imbedded in particular social 
relationships,” and goes on to say that in the real world, morality consists of society 
reconciling a variety of normative theories and intuitive beliefs into a coherent whole 
(Wilson, 1996).  In broad terms, one can argue that the dilemmas which have occupied 
ethicists and philosophers since antiquity essentially revolve around the intricacies of Homo 
sapiens’ social existence. Killing, stealing, lying, giving, and so on might all be argued to be 
      MORAL INTUITION IN CLINCAL DECISION-MAKING                                     8 
 
The Online Journal of Health Ethics Volume 7, No. 1 April, 2011 
 
 
intrinsically social concepts. They all noticeably require the assumption of social 
relationships or interactions in order to make them ethical issues in the first place. (For 
example, can stealing pose a moral dilemma if there is no ‘agent of moral concern’ to steal 
from? Similarly, can killing present an ethical dilemma if there is no-one or nothing to kill?) 
With a socially-based perspective such as this, it seems most (if not all) ethical dilemmas 
invariably require at least two moral subjects related to each other in some physical or 
circumstantial way by their actions, behaviours or intentions.  
 Furthermore, it is from within this socially-orientated moral sphere then that we 
develop and refine our day-to-day ethical concepts or judgments which form the basis of our 
moral experience and understanding. As suggested earlier, our developing intuitions and 
“common ethical concepts” appear to allow us to navigate the moral dilemmas of normal life 
successfully, enough at least to function well within our social relationships or environments. 
This process may appear subjective and culturally conditioned, but it is at least justifiable 
(and—arguably—acceptable) within our real world of ethical decision-making. One might 
take this argument a step further to suggest the social conditioning of our moral intuitions 
might be enough to give more credence to our intuitive unease when we find it arising in 
response to a presumptuous and ‘cumbersome’ normative theory. 
Intuition and normative theory—striking the balance 
 One way of explaining the apparent discrepancy between normative theories and 
moral intuitions may be by appreciating that our common morality, by definition, functions 
within the real world and not within an abstract or theoretical dimension. Within our real 
world it is an unfortunate reality that there is a large number of infants born into 
circumstances as dire as those encountered by Dr. Munro. In the flurry of resulting 
discussions and debates we must not lose sight of the fact we are seeking real answers to real-
life questions about how these children ought to be treated during the course of their 
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tragically short lives. In such situations, rigid theoretical ethics might, therefore, present 
significant difficulties for those hoping to ‘solve’ practical problems (Elliot, 1992). The result 
of this approach is an apparent mismatch between what our normative theories can logically 
justify but what we find acceptable as fallible, idiosyncratic, and socially-orientated beings. 
 I do not at this point intend to propose all normative theories should therefore be 
completely abandoned in favour of our intuitive moral beliefs. I firmly believe the principle 
normative theories used in ethics—be they consequentialist, deontological or otherwise—can 
each provide commendable and valid approaches to help analyse or debate moral dilemmas. I 
simply mean to suggest that the satisfactory resolution of real ethical problems should not rest 
solely with these familiar normative giants. This seems particularly evident to me when, for 
example, a mere calculation of utility can be used to justify an action which makes many feel 
morally uneasy—as in the case of Dr. Munro. Equally, we can often find that with two 
related theories - such as act and rule utilitarianism - people can reasonably disagree over 
what conclusions they yield when applied to clinical cases. This demonstrates the general 
problem of bridging the gap between our theories and our real life clinical cases. In such 
situations, to use our moral intuitions to question, enhance or moderate a normative position 
clearly takes considerable courage, for as we have seen it would be easy to disregard such 
feelings as subjective or unreliable. But to ignore or fear our moral intuitions when used in 
this way would be to overlook the valuable social perspective they may provide to the ethical 
deliberations in progress. Such a suggestion is, therefore, only truly aimed at those theorists 
holding the strictest normative positions (be they consequentialists, deontologists or 
otherwise) who believe that all other concepts or considerations outside the remit of their 
particular theory is untenable.  
 My overall position can now be articulated. In those rare clinical circumstances in 
which our moral intuitions appear to conflict with our normative conclusions, it may be 
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unwise to disregard completely the anti-normative unease outright. Such feelings may be 
criticised as subjective, emotional, labile or unreliable, and yet it is this same subjectivity 
which brings a necessary measure of humanity and socially-orientated compassion to the 
otherwise mechanical ethical calculations. The incorporation of moral intuitions in these 
difficult deliberations helps us to acknowledge the light they shed on the social reality of the 
unfolding drama, to awaken our moral senses to the human crisis being engulfed by the 
impersonal and unyielding ethical ‘machinery’. In the cases of Baby X and Baby Y, the crisis 
revolved around two helpless infants struggling to survive. The babies and their distraught 
families represented one of the social aspects of a tragic situation. But we must also reflect on 
our standards and beliefs at such times, and be prepared to question behaviours or actions 
which appear to challenge the boundaries of social and moral acceptability. It is this social 
aspect too that we must not overlook when making our decisions. Real-life ethical choices 
affect many people—vulnerable patients, their families, and the healthcare team. It is hard to 
imagine situations more deserving of some measure of intuitive moral reflection than these—
especially when it appears a familiar normative theory is being exploited so as to find 
convenient justifications for morally questionable actions. 
Conclusion 
The GMC ruling on the case of Dr. Munro was notable for the way it appeared to 
sanction the controversial treatment of two terminally ill children using a vague and 
generalised utilitarian justification. This causes concern for those who believe the familiar 
normative theories may be inadequate when used in isolation to tackle complex ethical 
dilemmas in real clinical situations. In rare situations where our common moral intuitions and 
the normative position disagree or conflict, I suggest there are justifiable reasons for not 
completely disregarding our ‘subjective’ moral unease when it arises. Our moral intuitions 
can be argued to be both hallmarks and products of our complex social existence. The unease 
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we subsequently feel in certain clinical dilemmas might be an indication that the normative 
positions can potentially overlook essential social and humanitarian perspectives in their 
decision-making process. 
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